Decision Theory and Stochastic
Growth, with Robson
and Samuelson, presentation, přednáška

*Online
talk scheduled for Oct 4 ^{th}, 3 pm UK time at Seminars in
Economic Theory*

This paper examines connections between stochastic
growth and decision problems. We use tools from the theory of large deviations
to show that wishful thinking decision problems are
equivalent to utility maximization problems, both of which are equivalent to
growth maximization under idiosyncratic risk.
Rational inattention problems are equivalent to growth-optimal portfolio
problems, both of which are equivalent to growth maximization under aggregate
risk. Stochastic growth generates extreme inequality, with nearly all wealth
eventually held by those who happen to have faced an empirical distribution of
shocks that matches the solution to the wishful thinking or rational
inattention problem.

Demad in
the Dark, with Kocourek
and Stewart, presentation

A growing body of evidence suggests that consumers are not fully informed about prices, contrary to a critical
assumption of classical consumer theory. We analyze a
model in which consumer types can vary in both their preferences and their
information about prices. Given data on demand and the distribution of prices,
we identify the set of possible values of the consumer surplus. Each surplus in
this set can be rationalized with simple information structures
and preferences. We also show how to narrow down the set of values using richer
datasets and provide bounds on counterfactual demands at perfectly observed
prices.

Endogenous Risk Attitudes,
with Netzer, Robson and Kocourek, presentation

In a model inspired by neuroscience, we show that
constrained optimal perception encodes lottery rewards using an S-shaped
encoding function and over-samples low-probability events. The implications of
this perception strategy for behavior depend on the
decision-maker's understanding of the risk. The strategy does not distort
choice in the limit as perception frictions vanish when the decision-maker
fully understands the decision problem. If, however, the decision-maker
underrates the complexity of the decision problem, then risk attitudes reflect
properties of the perception strategy even for vanishing perception frictions.
The model explains adaptive risk attitudes and probability weighting, as in
prospect theory and, additionally, predicts that risk attitudes are
strengthened by time pressure and attenuated by anticipation of large risks.

Attention
Please!** **with Gossner and Stewart, 2021, *Econometrica* 89(4), 1717-1751,
presentation, puzzle

We study the impact of manipulating the attention of a
decision-maker who learns sequentially about a number of items before making a
choice. Under natural assumptions on the decision-maker's strategy, directing
attention toward one item increases its likelihood of being chosen regardless
of its value. This result applies when the decision-maker can reject all items
in favor of an outside option with known value; if no
outside option is available, the direction of the effect of manipulation
depends on the value of the item. A similar result applies to manipulation of
choices in bandit problems.

Optimal Test Allocation,
2021, with Ely, Galeotti
and Jann, *J.
Econ. Theory* 105236

Rotation as Contagion
Mitigation, 2021, with Ely and Galeotti,
*Management Science*, 67(5), 3117-3126
(ideas from this paper have been incorporated into the DELVE
report of the Royal Society)

Habits as Adaptations: An
Experimental Study, 2020, with Matyskova,
Rogers, and Sun, presentation, *Game
Econ Behav* 122, 391-406

Selective
Sampling with Information-Storage Constraints, 2020,** **with Jehiel, presentation, *Economic Journal*, 1753-1781

On the Cost of
Misperception: General Results and Behavioral
Applications, 2018, with Gossner, *J. Econ.
Theory *177, 816-847*, *presentation

Rational Inattention Dynamics:
inertia and delay in decision-making, 2017, with Stewart
and Matějka, *Econometrica**, *85(2),* *521-553*, *presentation, popularizační přednáška

Perceiving Prospects Properly,
2016, with Stewart,
*American Economic Review *106,
1601-31, presentation, press
summary by AEA

Price Distortions under Coarse
Reasoning with Frequent Trade, 2015, with Stewart, *J.
Econ. Theory *159, 574-595,* *presentation, supplement

Influential Opinion Leaders,
2014, with Stewart
and Loeper,
*Economic Journal *124, 1147-1167

Tractable Dynamic
Global Games and Applications, 2013, with Mathevet, *J.
Econ. Theory *148, 2583-2619

Reversibility in Dynamic
Coordination Problems, 2013, with Kováč, *Game Econ Behav 77, 298-320*

Who Matters in Coordination Problems?,
2012, with Sákovics,
*American Economic Review *102(7),
3439-3461

Dynamic
Coordination with Private Learning, 2012, with Dasgupta
and Stewart, *Game Econ Behav *74, 83-101

Communication, Timing, and Common Learning,
2011, with Stewart, *J.
Econ. Theory *146, 230-247,
(the paper explained on the blog
of Jeff Ely)

Contagion through Learning, 2008, with Stewart, *Theoretical
Economics *3, 431-458

Coordination of Mobile Labor, 2008,
*J. Econ. Theory *139(1), 25-46

Coordination Cycles, 2008, *Game Econ Behav *63(1), 308-327

The Effects of Risk Aversion in Mixed-Strategy
Equilibria of 2x2 Games, 2007, with Engelmann, *Game Econ Behav *60, 381-388

A
Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms, 2007, *Economics
Bulletin, vol. 8*.

Dynamic
scaling and universality in evolution of fluctuating random networks, 2002,
with Kotrla and Slanina, *Europhys**. Lett. *60, 14-20