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Lecture 2 - Experiment
SET UP:
In this game you will have to make decisions repeatedly in several rounds. In every round you should choose a number in the interval [0–100]. You are allowed to choose 0 and 100. The winning number is the number closest to 2/3 of the average of all the numbers chosen by your group:
numbers A,B,C,D,E then the average is (A+B+C+D+E)/5=avg
winning number – one that is closest to the 2/3*avg
RESULTS:
row 1; row 2; row 3; row 4; row 5; row 6; row 7; row 8; row 9; row 10; row 11; row 12
Average numbers played:
round\row |
overall |
||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 |
51.0 |
43.6 |
29.1 |
37.1 |
48.4 |
44.7 |
34.9 |
30.4 |
15.9 |
40.3 |
53.0 |
54.4 |
38.4 |
2 |
24.7 |
26.7 |
32.9 |
24.2 |
22.9 |
28.1 |
15.6 |
27.3 |
12.1 |
29.3 |
32.7 |
43.8 |
25.4 |
3 |
12.2 |
20.2 |
14.9 |
17.0 |
10.9 |
15.7 |
20.8 |
43.0 |
6.0 |
35.3 |
34.8 |
23.3 |
21.2 |
4 |
6.0 |
7.3 |
35.4 |
7.7 |
14.6 |
20.4 |
7.2 |
26.3 |
9.0 |
12.1 |
6.2 |
3.0 |
14.1 |
participants |
6 |
10 |
8 |
6 |
10 |
10 |
9 |
12 |
11 |
8 |
6 |
4 |
100 |
points |
0.3 |
0.5 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.5 |
0.5 |
0.45 |
0.6 |
0.55 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.2 |
points - points received in one round when the person won (splitted if there are more winners in the round)
by clicking on the row's number you can get the detailed results for the row
overall - weighted average
Winning numbers (2/3 of the average):
round\row |
overall |
||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 |
34.0 |
29.1 |
19.4 |
24.7 |
32.3 |
29.8 |
23.3 |
20.3 |
10.6 |
26.8 |
35.3 |
36.3 |
25.6 |
2 |
16.4 |
17.8 |
21.9 |
16.1 |
15.3 |
18.7 |
10.4 |
18.2 |
8.1 |
19.5 |
21.8 |
29.2 |
16.9 |
3 |
8.1 |
13.4 |
9.9 |
11.3 |
7.3 |
10.5 |
13.9 |
28.7 |
4.0 |
23.5 |
23.2 |
15.5 |
14.1 |
4 |
4.0 |
4.9 |
23.6 |
5.1 |
9.7 |
13.6 |
4.8 |
17.5 |
6.0 |
8.1 |
4.1 |
2.0 |
9.4 |
In this game you can see whether people are perfectly rational - whether they tend to anticipate that other players are rational and use iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies or are learning and getting experience and beliefs about the other players throughout the game.
As this game has the only Nash Equilibrium when all the players are playing 0, you can see that the students were converging to this strategy over time, however, were not playing it from the beginning.