MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN ECONOMICS - SPRING 2011

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• Syllabus
• Instructor: Georgi Burlakov - contact
• Office Hours: 5-6 p.m. on the day of the lecture (Room 0136)
• Official Course Page: M9302 Mathematical Models in Economics
• Jan Mysliveček's Page (in Czech): Studijní materiály předmětu PřF:M9302

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Lecture Notes

• Gibbons' (1997) JEP paper
  
• Lecture 1, 24.02.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 1.1 Static Games of Complete Information - Slides1.1
  
  
• Tutorial Session 1, 03.03.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 1.2 Economic Application:
  • Cournot (1838) Model of Imperfect Competition
  • Bertrand (1883) Model of Imperfect Competition
  • Farber (1980) Model of Final-offer Arbitration
  • Hardin (1968) Model on Tragedy of Gommons (described initially by Hume (1739))
  
  
  
• Lecture 2, 10.03.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information Slides2.1
  
  
• Tutorial Session 2, 17.03.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 2.2 Economic Application:
  • Stackelberg (1934) Model of Imperfect Competition
  • Leontief (1946) Model of Wages and Employment Setting in a Unionized Firm /graphical solution/
  • Rubinstein (1982) Model of Sequential Bargaining /as solved in Shaked and Sutton (1984)/
  
  
  
• Lecture 3, 24.03.2011, 2-3 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 2.3 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information Slides2.3
  
  
• Tutorial Session 3, 24.03.2011, 3-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 2.4 Economic Application:
  • Diamond & Dybvig (1983) Simple Model of Bank Runs
  • McMillan (1986) Model of Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition
  
  
  
• Lecture 4.1, 31.03.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 2.5.1 (Finitely) Repeated Games Slides2.5
  
  
• Lecture 4.2, 07.04.2011, 3-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 2.5.2 (Infinitely) Repeated Games Slides2.5 /updated on 07.04.2011/
  
  
• Tutorial Session 4, 14.04.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 2.6 Economic Application:
  • Collusion between Cournot Duopolists
  
  
  
• Lecture 5, 21.04.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 3.1 Static Games of Incomplete Information Slides3.1
  
  
• Tutorial Session 5, 28.04.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 3.2.1 Economic Application:
  • Cournot Duopoly Competition under Asymmetric Information supplementary handout
  • First-price Sealed-bid Auction
  
  
  
• Lecture 6, 05.05.2011, 2-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 4.1 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
  • Signaling Games
  • First-price, Sealed-bid Auction and Signaling Games examples supplementary handout
  
  
  
• Tutorial Session 6, 12.05.2011, 4-5 p.m., Lecture Room M3
  &mdash Slot 4.2 Economic Application
  • Spence's (1973) Job Market Signaling model

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  Homework Assignments
  
  • Homework 1 /updated on 17.03.2011/
  • Homework 2

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  Written Exam Information
  
  • Midterm Exam, 07.04.2011, 2-3 p.m., Lecture Room M3
    Performance statistics: Min: 13, Max: 25, Mean: 19.25; distribution
    
    
  • Final Exam: 26.05.2011, 2-4 p.m., Lecture Room M3
    Preliminary dates: 12.05./19.05.2011, 2-4 p.m.