

Constrained Data-Fitters

an inspiration from machine learning

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The Map is Not the Territory


Alfred Korzybski



- 1 Homo Economicus
- 2 But
- 3 Approximate Updates and Likelihood
- 4 Microfoundations
- 5 Optimal Simplicity
- 6 Misspecification and Beyond
- 7 (not so) Rational Expectations
- 8 Experiments


Statistical Model

a "map"




Using the Model

a posteriori optimal choice



Posterior Approach

same model, different perspective



How are the Models Chosen?

estimation

unknown data-generating process $q(y)$

maximum-likelihood estimate

$$\arg \max_{p \in \mathcal{P}} p\text{-likelihood}(y_1, \dots, y_n)$$


Wald'49:

well-specified agent learns the true distribution: $p_n \rightarrow q$

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People Aren't Bayesian

Benjamin'19, Ortoleva'24




People are Misspecified

true process is not included in the set of hypotheses

Berk'66, White'82:

as the sample expands, the estimate converges to the **least wrong model**

$$\arg \min_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \text{KL}(q \parallel p)$$



Machines aren't Bayesian Either

Variational Bayes Methods


Blei et al. '17:

One of the core problems of modern statistics is to approximate difficult-to-compute probability densities. This problem is especially important in Bayesian statistics, which frames all inference [...] involving the posterior density.

the true posterior is **projected** on a set of tractable distributions

Machines Are Misspecified Too

generative task




how it's done:

- estimate $q(x)$ from the training sample
- draw x_{n+1} from the estimated distribution

two frictions:

- misspecification
- fit is difficult to evaluate


Variational Autoencoders




Variational Autoencoders



Variational Autoencoders



Variational Autoencoders




generative model

vs


recognition model

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Two Models



generative model $p(x, z) = p(z)p(x | z)$



recognition model $q(x, z) = q_0(x)q(z | x)$

Example

generative model:

- $p(z)$ prior distribution of talent in population
- $p(x | z)$ stochastic CV of each talent type

recognition model:

- large sample of the job applicants' CVs
- $q_0(x)$ – empirical distribution of the sample
- belief $q(z | x)$ about talent z of a candidate with CV x

Choice of the Two Models

let's proceed backwards

given the generative model, choose the **recognition model**

- that is most consistent with the generative model
- subject to a cognitive constraint

choose the **generative model** with the best subjective fit to data

- accounting for own cognitive constraint during updating

Choice of the Recognition model

variational Bayes' methods, Jordan et al.'99

$$\min_{\tilde{q}(x,z)} \text{KL}(\tilde{q}(x,z) \parallel p(x,z))$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \tilde{q}(x,z) \in \mathcal{Q}$$

$$\tilde{q}(x) = q_0(x)$$

Choice of the Recognition model

variational Bayes' methods, Jordan et al.'99

$$\min_{\tilde{q}(x,z)} \text{KL}(\tilde{q}(x,z) \parallel p(x,z))$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \tilde{q}(x,z) \in \mathcal{Q}$$

$$\tilde{q}(x) = q_0(x)$$

empirical constraint

Choice of the Recognition model

variational Bayes' methods, Jordan et al.'99

$$\min_{\tilde{q}(x,z)} \text{KL}(\tilde{q}(x,z) \parallel p(x,z))$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \tilde{q}(x,z) \in \mathcal{Q}$$

$$\tilde{q}(x) = q_0(x)$$

updating constraint

Choice of the Recognition model

variational Bayes' methods, Jordan et al.'99

$$\min_{\tilde{q}(x,z)} \text{KL}(\tilde{q}(x,z) \parallel p(x,z))$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \tilde{q}(x,z) \in \mathcal{Q}$$

$$\tilde{q}(x) = q_0(x)$$

subjective fit

Choice of the Generative Model

variational autoencoder, Kingma&Welling'13


$$\min_{\tilde{p}(x,z), \tilde{q}(x,z)} \text{KL}(\tilde{q}(x,z) \parallel \tilde{p}(x,z))$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \tilde{p}(x,z) \in \mathcal{P}$$

$$\tilde{q}(x,z) \in \mathcal{Q}$$

$$\tilde{q}(x) = q_0(x)$$

Information Geometry



Some Updating Constraints

no constraint:

- $\mathcal{Q} = \Delta(X \times Z)$

⇒ back to homo economicus:

- Bayesian updates: $q(z | x) = p(z | x)$
- standard likelihood

Some Updating Constraints

computational constraint:

- \mathcal{Q} is a family of tractable distributions

relevant in machine learning

Some Updating Constraints

causal constraint; e.g.:

- $x = CV$, $z = (\text{aptitude}, \text{grit})$
- q must comply with a causal graph, e.g.:

$$\text{aptitude} \rightarrow CV \leftarrow \text{grit}$$

- \Leftrightarrow a factorization constraint on $q(CV, \text{aptitude}, \text{grit})$

see Spiegler'20 for review

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Updating As Constrained Optimization

Kullback'59 [principle of minimum discrimination information](#)

- posterior minimizes KL-divergence from prior s.t. new information
- originates in Laplace's principle of insufficient reason

Dominiak, Kovach & Tserenjigmid'21

- axiomatization and extensions

In Machine Learning

machine evaluates fit of a model $p(x, z)$ to observable data x

- intractable marginalization $p(x) = \sum_z p(x, z)$

instead, the machine evaluates **evidence lower bound**

Sanov's Theorem

draw a large sample from p

suppose the empirical distribution q is in \mathcal{Q}

then, it is

$$\begin{aligned} \arg \min_{\tilde{q}} & \quad \text{KL}(\tilde{q} \parallel p) \\ \text{s.t.} & \quad \tilde{q} \in \mathcal{Q} \end{aligned}$$

our agent reasons about the sample of (x, z) s.t. the constraints

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Example

$x = CV$, $z = (\text{aptitude}, \text{grit})$

generative model:

- any $p(\text{aptitude}, \text{grit})$
- restrictions imposed on $p(CV \mid \text{aptitude}, \text{grit})$

recognition model:


- $CV \rightarrow \text{aptitude} \rightarrow \text{grit}$

deterministic collapse

The agent models **grit** as a deterministic function of **aptitude**.

grit has no explanatory power at the recognition stage
 \Rightarrow it is not used in the generative stage

Generalization



deterministic collapse

The agent models variables from outside the Markov Boundary as a deterministic function of the variables from within the boundary.

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
Two Frictions

| | | \mathcal{P} | |
|---------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | | Well-specified | Miss-specified |
| \mathcal{Q} | Bayes' Rationality | Wald'49 | Berk'66 |
| | Updating Friction | model-fitting | model-fitting |

Correlation Neglect

$x = (\text{IQ score, education})$ and $z = (\text{aptitude, grit})$

the true process $q_0(\text{IQ, edu})$ exhibits correlation




agent is well-specified

- \Rightarrow she learns the true process if updating is unconstrained

Correlation Neglect

$x = (\text{IQ score}, \text{education})$ and $z = (\text{aptitude}, \text{grit})$

the true process $q_0(\text{IQ}, \text{edu})$ exhibits correlation



the updating constraint

- \Rightarrow optimal correlation neglect $p(\text{IQ}, \text{edu}) = p(\text{IQ})p(\text{edu})$

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Rational Expectations

definition

definition

The agent has **rational expectations** if she isn't systematically surprised:

$$p(z) = E_{q_0(x)} q(z | x).$$

in general, our agent does not have RE

Rational Expectations

result

proposition

An agent who can conceive any $p(z)$ forms rational expectations.

standard RE is forced by the Bayes' law

- RE can fail in our framework, but hold at the optimum

a popular non-Bayesian intuition in support of RE:

- systematically surprised agent should adjust her prior ✓

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Dean & Neligh '23:

observable information structures

Individual Decision-Making Experiment

Instructions

Example Question

Remember:

- With 50% probability there will be 49 red dots
- With 50% probability there will be 51 red dots



Please select from the following options:

| Option | Pay if there are 49 red dots | Pay if there are 51 red dots |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| <input type="radio"/> A | 10 | 0 |
| <input checked="" type="radio"/> B | 0 | 10 |
| <input type="radio"/> C | 5 | 5 |

[← Previous](#) [Next →](#)

Aina, Amelio & Brütt'23

- is it misspecification? Bohren & Hauser'23
- failure of Bayesian reasoning?

Conditional




All-Contingency



Narratives

Andre, Haaland, Roth & Wohlfart'23


Example A




Example B



Example C



Machines and Humans



machines

- variational autoencoders

humans


- predictive coding

machine as a model of humans?

- perfect fMRI: observable latent representation
- flexible design: you can deceive machine
- twin studies: copies of the same machine

Experimental Methods in Machine Learning

Akhtar et al. '21



this informs about the geometry of the latent representation

Literature

non-Bayesian updating: Dominiak, Kovach & Tserenjigmid '21; Jakobsen '21; Ortoleva '12; Zhao '22

machine learning: Caplin, Martin & Marx '23; Zhao, Ke, Wang & Hsieh '20; Aridor, da Silveira & Woodford '24

Bayesian networks: Spiegel '16, '20; Sloman '05; Pearl '88; Ambuehl & Thysen '24; Andre, Haaland, Roth & Wohlfart '23

belief inconsistencies: Aina, Amelio & Brütt '23; Bohren & Hauser '23

misspecified learning: Esponda & Pouzo '16; Fudenberg, Lanzani & Strack '21; Frick, Iijima, & Ishii '23