Understanding Vacancy Yields: Evidence from German Data

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- Fact: firms' hiring behavior differs in the cross-section as well as over time (BC's).
- What the paper does/will do?
 - Relates the cross-sectional differences in hiring to recruiting intensity, hiring standards and wages.
 - ② Build a theoretical model which provides a particular causal interpretation and decomposition.
 - ③ Goal is to have a quantititative model to account for the contribution of the 3 channels to diffs in hiring. And more
- This discussion: go over 1-3, provide comments along the way.

Provides three sets of results:

- (1.) Vacancy yields (number of hires divided by the number of vacancies) vary a lot by employment growth.
 - Not consistent with standard search-and-matching.
 - True also for hiring and vacancy rates.
 - Firms appear less picky when they grow faster.

(2.) Higher hiring rates are positively correlated with:

- Higher recruitment intensity.
- 2 Lower hiring standards.
- 3 Higher wages.
- All intuitive, but ... Cannot do this at establishment level for vacancy yields, as too many no vacancies reported. What about measurement error for the aggregate results then?
- Causality? Paper runs non-parametric regressions as follows:

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{n} \beta_n D_n + controls,$$

where $y_{i,t}$ are the variables above and D_n are dummy variables for bins of the hiring rate.

- Why non-parametric? Numbers somewhat hard to interpret.
- 2 Why that 'order'. More natural perhaps:

$$\log hr_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{k} \beta^{k} \log y_{i,t}^{k} + controls.$$

- 3 Do we have causality now? No. Endogeneity issues ...
- Is establishing causality the goal here? Should it be?

Empirical Results 3: Relationship between labor market tightness and the variables above.

Comment: be more explicit about your data and regressions.

- 1) Continuous time, ∞ horizon.
- 2 Risk-neutral workers and firms.
- 3 Output $p \cdot x$. Distributions of p and x critical.
- ④ Firms post V vacancies with recruiting intensity R, threshold \bar{x} and wage schedule w(x).
- Search competitive.
- Two-sided commitment upon meeting.

More productive (higher p) firms hire more:

- have more vacancies,
- 2 have lower hiring standards $\bar{x}(C)$,
- (3) choose higher recruiting intensity (A),
- ④ set higher wages (B).

$$dh/h = dp/p \cdot (A + B + C) \cdot term$$

Link to vacancy yields? Business cycles? Data in general?

- More productive firms hire less productive workers. Why?
 - 1) Given p output linear $p \cdot x$.
 - 2 No DRS in # of workers (skills).
 - 3 If 1 firm hires 1 worker, positive correlation between p and x.
 - ④ Like in models with complementarity between skills of workers and managers (Kapička, Slavík, 202?).
 - 5 Data?
- Double wage offer indeterminacy. Troublesome for comparison with data. Introduce risk aversion?

- What exactly is it that one can answer with a quantitative model but not with data only?
 - Decomposition? Really?
 - ② Counterfactual policy analysis.
 - 3 Policy analysis.
- 2 Calibration of dist. of p and x.
 - If x were worker characteristics, get dist. of p as residuals from Mincerian type regression.
 - 2 But it is not. What is x?
 - ③ Perhaps, controlling for both worker and firm characteristics, one gets the dist. of x?

- Nice paper, empirical part and model interesting.
- Link of model/data in the quant. model needs some work.
- Sharper punchline?