



MINIMUM WAGES, UNIONS, BARGAINING

Mariola Pytliková

CERGE-EI and VŠB-Technical University Ostrava,

CReAM, IZA, CCP and CELSI

Info about lectures: <http://home.cerge-ei.cz/munich/labor15/>

Office hours: by appointment

Contact:

Email: Mariola.Pytlikova@vsb.cz

Mobile: 739211312

<https://sites.google.com/site/pytlikovaweb/>

Mandatory:

- Borjas: Labor Economics: Labor Demand, Chapter 3;
- Borjas: Labor Economics: Labor Unions, Chapter 10;
- Card D. and Krueger A. (1994) 'Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania', *American Economic Review* 84: 772–793.

Optional:

- Eriksson, T., Pytlikova, M. and F. Warzynski (2013): "Increased Sorting and Wage Inequality in the Neumark, David; Wascher, William (December 2000). "Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment". *The American Economic Review* **90** (5): 1362–96. [doi:10.1257/aer.90.5.1362](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.5.1362).
- Eriksson, T. and M. Pytlikova (2004): "Firm-level Consequences of Large Minimum Wage Increases in the Czech and Slovak Republics". *Labour*. Vol. 18, No.1, pp. 75-103.

Study Materials and Reading List

- **Popular media and policy reports on Minimum Wages:**
- The Economist
- <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21659741-global-movement-toward-much-higher-minimum-wages-dangerous-reckless-wager>
- OECD/IZA World of Labor Seminar: Minimum Wages – Impacts and Institutional
- http://www.iza.org/conference_files/WoLSeminar_1/viewProgram?conf_id=2668
- IZA WORLD OF LABOUR ON EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MINIMUM WAGES:
- <Http://wol.iza.org/articles/employment-effects-of-minimum-wages>
- VoxEU: **Minimum wages: the effects on employment and labour-force turnover**
- <http://www.voxeu.org/article/minimum-wages-and-jobs-new-evidence>

- **Further:** Slides of the lectures

- All materials provided on: <http://home.cerge-ei.cz/munich/labor15/>

OUTLINE

- A quick retake of Labor Demand theory
- Policy Application to the Labor Demand Theory:
 - Minimum Wages
 - Unions and bargaining

Policy Application: Minimum Wages

- Objectives of the minimum wage
 - Improve living standards of low-paid workers
 - Protect workers in least organised sectors
 - Prevent exploitation
 - Reduce wage inequality
- Functions of the minimum wage
 - Reference wage:
 - Basis for individual and collective negotiation
 - Instrument of income policy:
 - Used to determine a number of social benefits:
 - Pensions
 - Maternity allowance
 - Unemployment benefits
 - Disability benefits, etc.



Example - The Netherlands

Unemployment benefits

Minimum benefit is 70% of minimum wage for single persons. Adjustments twice a year according to changes in net minimum wages.

Maternity benefits

100% of actual earnings for employees. Unemployed workers receive 100% of earnings with a maximum of the minimum wage.

Pensions

Minimum pension rates are linked to the minimum wage.

Pensions are automatically adjusted twice a year according to changes in net minimum wages.

Disability benefits

Minimum benefit is 70% of minimum wage for single persons.

Adjustments twice a year according to changes in net minimum wages.

Policy Application: Minimum Wages

- Set by:
 - a government
 - an outcome of negotiations between workers and firm representatives.
- Types:
 - A national, government legislated MW
 - Industry level minimum wage
- Minima – hourly, daily, weekly and monthly basis;
- Reduced or sub-minimum wages for some groups of workers (age, qualifications..)
- What do we know about the impact – on employment and wages?

Table 2.1 Minimum Wages in OECD Countries (2005)

	Minimum wage to average wage ratio ¹ (%)	Minimum wage (€ per hour)	Minimum wage ² (€ per month) PPP	Determination ³		Coverage ⁴
				Setting	Level	
Australia		7.25	1277	-	-	80
Austria				CB-L	P	95
Belgium	43	6.93	1220	CB	N	90
Canada	35	4.75	836	L	F-P	100
Czech Republic	39	1.58	278	L	N	100
Denmark				CB	-	80
Finland				CB	N	90
France	52	7.51	1322	L	N	100
Germany				CB	-	68
Greece		3.29	578	L	N	100
Hungary	38	1.28	225	L	N	100
Iceland				CB	-	-
Ireland	53	7.43	1308	CB	N	100
Italy				CB	N	80
Japan	40	4.15	731	L	P	100 ^a
Korea	27	2.64	464	-	-	10
Luxembourg				L	N	100 ^b
Netherlands	39	7.30	1284	L	N	100 ^c
New Zealand	48	4.98	877	L	N	25
Poland	40	1.35	237	L	N	100
Portugal	53	2.08	366	L	N	100
Slovak Republic				L	N	100
Spain	40	3.40	599	L	N	100
Turkey		2.78	489	L	-	100
United Kingdom	39	6.40	1127	L	N	100 ^d
United States	31	3.48	613	L	N	100

Monthly minimum wage in the EU, in EUR

Source: Eurostat (2015)

Country	2014 (€)	2015 (€)
1. Luxembourg	1921,03	1922,96
2. Belgium	1501,82	1501,82
3. NL	1495,20	1501,80
4. Ireland	1461,85	1461,85
5. Germany	No MW	1473,00
6. France	1445,38	1457,52
7. UK	1301,31	1378,87
8. Slovenia	789,15	790,73
9. Spain	752,85	756,70
10. Malta	717,95	717,95
11. Greece	683,86	683,86
12. Portugal	565,83	589,17
13. Poland	404,16	409,53
14. Croatia	398,31	395,61
15. Estonia	355	390
16. Slovakia	352,00	380,00
17. Latvia	320,00	360,00
18. Hungary	328,16	332,76
19. Czechia	309,62	331,71
20. Lithuania	289,62	300,00
21. Romania	205,34	217,50
22. Bulgaria	173,84	184,07

Minimum wage as a % of average and median gross wage, 2012

	% mean	% median		% mean	% median
Australia	44	53	Lithuania	36	48
Belgium	43	51	Luxembourg	35	42
Canada	40	45	Mexico	19	..
Czech Rep	31	36	Netherlands	41	47
Chile	43	67	Poland	38	38
France	50	62	Romania	31	45
Greece	30	43	Slovakia	37	47
Hungary	40	54	Slovenia	48	60
Ireland	44	48	Spain	35	35
Estonia	30	42	UK	39	47
Latvia	38	51	United States	27	38

 See <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIN2AVE#>

Source: OECD

The Effect of MW Increases: Theory

Two Extreme Cases:

Competitive Labor Market

Monopsony


When both agree:

- the MW is too low = not binding
- the MW is too high = employment decrease


MW Increases: Theory – The Basic Competitive Model

- Assumption of labor demand theory of competitive markets : individual “price-taking firm”
- a firm that is a perfect competitor in the labor market faces a horizontal labor supply curve and can hire an unlimited number of workers at the market-clearing wage.

(a) Market




(b) A Typical Firm



Increases: Theory – the Basic Competitive

What happens if we impose a minimum wage in this labor market?



Imposing a binding MW reduces employment, since price is assumed to be constant and the MPL rises as the quantity of labor hired declines, the only way the firm can satisfy the profit maximizing condition is to reduce employment.

MW Increases—Competitive Labor Markets, Alternative Models I

The basic competitive model -many simplifying assumptions (like skill level of workers, non-adjustment of the output price or that a firm can hire unlimited No of workers at the market wage)

Alternative models:

- **Substitution model** – allows for heterogeneity of labor => two types of workers, skilled and unskilled.
- If a minimum wage is above the market-clearing wage of unskilled workers but below the wage of skilled workers, *the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers will rise.*
- If all firms hire more skilled workers, the market wage for skilled workers *is likely to rise* => it will dampen the increase in the number of skilled workers employed.
- The total employment effect cannot be positive in this model because the wages of at least one, and possibly both, types of workers increase.

MW Increases—Competitive Labor Markets, Alternative Models I

Substitution model – empirical evidence.

- Indirect support for the substitution model. Workers who have lower wages or be less skilled appear to be more adversely affected by MW increases than others, but the total employments seems to be unaffected.
- e.g. Currie and Fallick, 1996 and Neumark and Wascher, 1995 – less skilled teens less likely to remain employed after the MW rise, but substitutions of older and „white“ for younger teens and „minority workers“;
- Katz and Krueger, 1992 find a substitution of full time to part-time less skilled workers.

MW Increases—Competitive Labor Markets, Alternative Models II

Price Effects – allows for *adjustment of the output price*, depends on elasticity of demand and supply (if demand is completely inelastic/vertical/ employment does not fall because the price increase offsets the tendency for wage increase to reduce employment).

Empirical evidence – some support for the price effects (Card and Krueger, 1995; Aaronson, 1997; find that restaurant prices increases when MW rises); Some evidence that prices do not adjust or do not fully offset the MW increases.

Substitution by importing – allows for *relaxing the assumptions of non-existence of foreign trade*. Higher minimum wages leads to increase in costs => more expensive products => lower competitiveness => substitution of domestic production for imports => lower employment. *The effect of MW stronger for small open economies.*

MW Increases – Alternative models - MONOPSONY


In a case of monopsonist, there can be even an increase in an employment in reaction to an increase in a minimum wage.

A monopsonist is a firm that faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve (similarly as monopoly on the product market is facing downward sloping demand curve for its products)=> the firm must raise the wage in order to hire additional workers;

The monopsonist determines the quantity of labor to hire by setting the value of the marginal product equal to the marginal cost of labor. The marginal cost of labor is no longer equal to the wage. Instead, the cost of hiring an additional worker is the wage paid to that worker plus the increase in the wages of all current workers.

Marginal labor cost curve for this firm is even more upward sloping than the supply curve = marginal expense of labor exceeds the wage

Minimum-Wage Effects under Monopsonistic Conditions: Both Wages and Employment Can Increase in the Short Run



MW Increases - Monopsony

Some critique:

Monopsony less likely for the market for low-skilled labor, which is rather characterized by a large number of small firms.

But the case of monopsony similar for firms colluding in wage setting – collusion among employers may be favoured by collective bargaining institutions.

Further employers can have some degree of monopsony power also in the case of existence of *search frictions and mobility costs*. All these modern monopsony cases are rather frequent in practise (*Manning*)

- So in principle, few pure monopsonies, but many firms have some degree of monopsony power, e.g.:
 - Small "company town"
 - If skills are very specific e.g. IBM mainframe repair technicians
 - Hospital in the market for nurses, lab technicians, and radiologists
 - Fast food restaurants located in nearby towns.

MW Increases – Alternative models - DYNAMIC MONOPSONY

Models that focus on firms search for workers and workers search for jobs imply that a MW increases will not reduce employment.

Here, firms ability to hire or retain workers depends on their wages and wages offered by other firms.

Firms that offer higher wages attract and keep more higher quality workers. Imposing MW can rise wages of some firms and under assumptions do not lower employment in those firms.

SEARCH MODELS (ala Burdett and Mortensen, 1989) - in the models individuals accept any offer that exceeds their current wage. With the assumption of identical workers and firm, Burdett and Mortensen show that there is a distribution of wages across firm, with large firms paying higher wages. If unemployed have some reservation wage, and MW is set above the reservation wage, the MW increase does not have employment effects because all offers are accepted by unemployed.

Dynamic monopsony or imperfect search models more applicable than traditional monopsony. The key feature is that workers have imperfect information about job opportunities.

Some empirical facts seem to confirm the model:

- (1) larger firms pay higher wages,
- (2) low-wage firms have a high number of vacancies/firms with vacancies do not offer higher wages, as they would have to pay the higher wage also to current employees

The Effect of MW Increases: *THEORY*

- Minimum wage forces firms to:
 - Become more efficient
 - Rationalize production process
 - Invest in training
 - => increases in labour productivity
- Surplus labour finds employment in labour-demanding sectors
- Efficiency wages (a bit problematic wrt low-wage workers)

The Effect of MW Increases: *THEORY – WAGE EFFECTS*

Grossman 1984



Shifts in entire wage distribution

May magnify the employment effects;
May increase inflation



The Effect of MW Increases: Empirics

- Results mixed: mainly U.S evidence = small minimum wage changes; Early evidence that MW may reduced hiring of low-skilled, inexperienced workers -> higher unemployment among the workers. Problems with endogeneity.
- Results of some previous research based on firm-level data– source: Brown, Gilroy a Kohen, (1982, pg. 504).

	%change in employment (elasticity)	Change in unemployment rate (in %)
1. Kaitz (1970)	-0.98	-0.006
2. Adie (1971)	/	+2.525
3. Moore (1971)	/	+3.649
4. Koster & Welch (1972)	-2.96/	/
5. Kelly (1975)	-1.204	/
6. Gramlich (1976)	-0.94	/
7. Mincer (1976)	-2.31	+0.445
8. Welch (1976)	-1.78	/
9. Ragan (1977)	-0.65	+0.75
10. Mattila (1978)	-0.84	+0.10
11. Freeman (1979)	-2.46	0
12. Wachter a Kim (1979)	-2.519	+0.512
13. Iden (1980)	+2.26	/
Range	-0.98 / -2.519	-0.006 / +3.649

The Effect of MW Increases: Empirics

- Endogeneity - all of the models assume that a wage floor is imposed or raised, ignoring how the MW is determined
- The level of MW may depend on the expected effect on employment and economy
- Traditional empirical techniques used earlier to measure the effect of MW on employment do not account for the endogeneity, may yield incorrect results (typically time series regressions of MW on teen employment rate).
- Solutions: (1) natural experiment and DiD application, (2) IV (finding a source of variation in MW that are unrelated to economic condition),

Card & Krueger experiment & New Jersey Minimum Wage Law

- Card & Krueger experiment – effects of minimum wage hikes in the U.S. fast-food industry
- New Jersey raised minimum wage in 1992 (from \$4.25-\$5.05 per hour), whereas Pennsylvania did not
- The authors compare the change in NJ to the change in PA
- a difference-in-difference estimator, which allows to identify a causal effect, not just a correlation

Card and Krueger Experiment

- Widely cited study
- Huge controversy among economists
- Caused millions of workers to get a raise from the Clinton administration in 1995
- April 1, 1992: in New Jersey, the minimum wage rose from \$4,25 to \$5,05 per hour (19% increase)
- Pennsylvania did not raise the minimum wage
- Survey of 410 fast food restaurants
- Timing is: before (Feb.-March 1992) and after (Nov-Dec 1992)
- Most workers are teenagers
- Teenagers widely seen as potential losers of minimum wage policies

Card and Krueger Experiment

Per store employment

	before	after	Δ
NJ	20.44	21.03	$\Delta L_N = +0.59$
PA	23.33	21.37	$\Delta L_P = -2.16$

- Effect is $0.59 - (-2.16) = 2.76$ (with a standard error of 1.36, meaning it is statistically significant at the 5% since the t ratio is ~ 2.0)
- 2.76 is $\sim 13.5\%$ increase in employment in NJ relative to PA

Card and Krueger Experiment: Interpretations

1. Monopsony

Other interpretations:

2. Hungry teens

- when you put more money into workers' pockets, they go out and buy more stuff, stimulating the local economy and creating new jobs all around them

3. Motivational effects/efficiency wages (more people want to work for Burger King)

4. Confounding variables (shocks to PA that are not accounted for in this test)

The Effect of MW Increases: Empirics

- Studies based on natural experiments – using the difference-in-differences(DD) estimator – see Card & Krueger, later e.g. Steward (2004) for Britain = *critique*: focus only on a specific industry whereas competitive model apply to the labor market as a whole.
- IV - Neumark and Wascher (1992) use the average MW in neighboring states as an IV for state MW levels and find negative effect of MW rise. Critique: a problematic IV if neighboring states move together in business cycle.
- Studies using longitudinal data - *European Studies*:
 - Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis (1999)-negative effects
 - Machin, Manning & Rahman (2002) – positive on wages (less inequality), small employment effect.
- *Big changes in MW*:
 - Castillo-Freeman & Freeman (1991) for Puerto Rico
 - Rama (2001) for Indonesia
 - Portugal and Cardoso (2001) for Portugal
- no much research for new EU countries and economies in transition, where lots of labor market dynamics & changes happened
 - Estonia (Hinnossar & Rõõm, 2003): MW: + 95.5% (1995-2000); Employment of affected workers: -4.8%
 - Hungary (Kertesi & Köllö, 2002): MW: + 60%; Employment: -4%

Example: Effects of large MW hikes in the Czech and Slovak rep. Eriksson and Pytlikova (2004)

Policy Issues: should minimum wage increase or decrease?

- It seems as setting of the minimum wage is a matter of fine-tuning:
 - if it is too low it is not binding;
 - if it is too high, it can do worse than the market failure that it was supposed to address
- Strongest arguments in favor for an increase in the minimum wages rely on equity considerations – distributional effects and effects on poverty.

Policy application: Unions and Collective bargaining

Unions and Collective bargaining

- Unions
 - Historically emerged in the 18th century in th UK and the US as organizations insuring their members against unemployment, death, and old age.
 - In 19th century industrial unions;
 - 20th century increasingly national organizations aiming to represent all workers & having a stronger political power.
 - Stronger among manual workers
 - Goals – egalitarian wage policies, reduction of wage differentials
- Collective bargaining
 - National level – unions, employer's associations & politicians
 - Industry level agreements
 - Firm-level agreements
 - Hybrid or multilevel agreements

Unions and Collective bargaining

- *Bargains over:*
 - Wages, working hours, overtime, fringe benefits, employment security, health and safety standards. Power of strike threats.
 - Getting wages above reservation wages of otherwise uncoordinated individuals;
 - National labor unions bargain over minimum wages (previous slides), labor laws, age of retirements, family policies and unemployment benefits.
 - Bargains shifting product demand: unions lobby against legislation, such as e.g. free trade agreements that reduces imported goods; or directly influencing people's tastes for products, e.g. " buy Czech products" ...
 - Bargains restricting substitution:
 - lobby to increase costs of inputs that could be potential substitutes for union members, e.g. prevent employment of immigrants...
 - Lobby to restrict substitution in means of e.g. staffing requirements – to prevent employers from substituting capital for labor.
 - => activity of unions interact with many other institutions

Unions and Collective bargaining

- Cross-country comparisons ;
- Numbers and coverage vary considerably
- Changes over time – increasing divergence between unions presence (number of active members) and unions influence => *excess coverage of unions increasing over time*
- In some countries non-working members (e.g. Italy – more pensioners than workers in the largest unions)
- Last 20-30 years deunionization and decentralization
- In particular in:
 - the US – halved, nowadays in private sector under 10%
 - UK, especially under the Thatcher era
 - Australia (from 48-23)
 - New Zealand (from 56 to 13),
 - Southern Europe and the new EU countries after the communist breakdown
- But demand for unionization increases with economic downturns

Unions and Collective bargaining – Union membership in OECD countries 1960-2000





Figure 3.1 Union Membership in OECD Countries

Sources: OECD (2004) Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000).

Note: Weighted average of national union density rates, where union density is defined as members of working age as a fraction of employment and weights are the population shares.

Union Membership as a Percentage of All Workers, by Sector, United States, 1973–2008



E&S Figure 13.1

Unions –membership, coverage and excess coverage, 2000

	% Workers in firm joining employer association (%) (1)	% Workers covered by collective agreements (%) (2)	Workers joining trade unions market sector (%) (3)	Excess coverage (2) – (3)	Centralization	Coordination
Austria	96	97	34	63	3	4
Australia	–	80	35	45	2	2
Belgium	72	82	44	38	3	4
Canada	–	35	36	–1	1	1
Denmark	48	52	68	–16	2	4
Finland	58	67	65	2	5	5
France	74	75	10	65	2	2
Germany	72	80	25	55	3	4
Italy	40	81	36	45	2	4
Netherlands	79	79	19	60	3	4
Norway	54	62	44	18	4	4
Portugal	34	80	30	50	4	4
Spain	72	67	16	51	3	3
Sweden	56	72	77	–5	3	3
Switzerland	37	50	22	28	2	4
United Kingdom	54	35	19	16	1	1
United States	–	13	10	3	1	1

Sources: Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000); Boeri, Brugiavini, and Calmfors (2001); OECD (2006a).

Notes:

B&Ours Table 3.1

Union Membership and Bargaining Coverage, Selected Countries, 2004

Country	Union Membership as a Percentage of Workers	Percentage of Workers Covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement
Austria	37	98
France	10	93
Sweden	81	93
Australia	25	83
Italy	35	83
Netherlands	23	83
Germany	25	68
Switzerland	18	43
United Kingdom	31	33
Canada	28	32
Japan	22	18
United States	13	14

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, <http://www.oecd.org>; search under “union density, 2004.”

Unions and Collective bargaining

- Reasons for deunionization and decentralization:
 - Demographic changes – females, aging;
 - No incentives to join, as contracts extended also to nonunionized workers
 - Changing industrial mix – growing employment in wholesale and retail, finance & insurance, services; SBTCH; small firms
 - Competitive pressures – foreign competition in manufacturing etc.
 - Employers resistance

Percentage of U.S. Wage and Salary Workers Who Are Union Members, by Selected Characteristics, 2009


Percentage of U.S. Wage and Salary Workers Who Are Union Members, by Selected Characteristics, 2009

Men	13.3
Women	11.3
African American	13.9
Hispanic	10.1
White	12.1

By Industry

Mining	8.6
Construction	14.5
Manufacturing	10.9
Transportation, Public Utilities	22.2
Wholesale, Retail Trade	5.3
Finance, Insurance	1.4

Effects of Demand Growth and the Wage Elasticity of Demand on the Market Constraints Faced by Unions




Source: E&S- FIGURE 13.2

Unions and Collective bargaining, effect on wages and employment


- Unlike minimum wages, unions act on the entire wage distribution – not only on its lower end.
- Again a possibility to apply a monopsony model
- Given the equality goal – unions tend to compress wage distribution
 - =>crowd out least skilled workers located at the low end of the distribution to unemployment
 - =>reduce skill premium that would prevail in the case of absence of unions
=> high-skilled workers leave unions
 - =>membership concentrated around intermediate-skill positions => further compression

Spillover Effects of Unions on Wages and Employment



Source: E&S FIGURE 13.8 13-43

Threat Effects of Unions on Wages and Employment in Nonunion Sector



Unions and Collective bargaining, effect on wages and employment: Empirical evidence

- Estimates of effects of unions on wages of members X non-members => union wage gaps, and on the entire wage distribution, usually drawing on individual micro-data.

- Mincerian wage equations:

$$\log W_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_{it} + \beta_2 X_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- Where D_{it} is a dummy for union membership (1 when an individual is a member; 0 otherwise), X is a matrix of personal characteristics such as age, gender, education, tenure. β_1 represents coefficient of the estimated union wage gap.
- Estimates of β_1 range from 12-20% in the US, 3-19% in the UK. Usually a consensus that union membership associated with higher wages.
- Evidence of counter-cyclical union wage gap (higher in economic downturns)
- the effect of unionization or union decentralization on the entire wage distribution: usually unions reduce wage dispersion in countries with higher centralization of bargaining (e.g. Card 2002).

Unions and Collective bargaining, effect on wages and employment: Empirical evidence

- Estimates of effects of unions and bargaining on employment /unemployment, and inflation, drawing mostly on macroeconomic time series.
- Usually found a negative relationship between a degree of coordination and unemployment is observed, with higher coordination leading to lower unemployment.
 - BUT some recent studies find the opposite.
 - Also some studies find a U-shaped relationship with low unemployment at both low and high degrees of centralization, and high unemployment with hybrid/intermediate bargaining systems.
 - Unions and lower job turnover

Unions and Collective bargaining, effect on wages and employment: Empirical evidence

- Unions and wage dispersion:
 - wage dispersion about 25% lower in union firms than in nonunion firms (lower returns to skills, union workers more homogenous,...)
 - Evidence that unionization reduces wage dispersion by about 10% (Card, 1996)
- Unions and fringe benefits
- Unions and firm outcomes:
 - Union firms more productive,
 - Negative effects of unions on profits and shareholders wealth