



a. IMPACT OF NON-LABOR INCOME X_0



leisure normal good

Andri

$$\left. \frac{\partial L}{\partial X_0} \right|_w < 0$$




leisure inferior good

trabant

$$\left. \frac{\partial L}{\partial X_0} \right|_w > 0$$

• IMPACT OF WAGE (w)




$$pX = wL$$

$$X = L \frac{w}{p}$$

$$X = (L_{max} - l) \frac{w}{p}$$



set $p = 1$




INCOME EFFECT $+\frac{\partial L}{\partial I}$

SUBSTITUTION EF $+(1) \frac{dL}{dw}$

TOTAL EFFECT $\left. \frac{\partial L}{\partial w} \right|_{X_0} \geq 0$ subst. e. dominant income effect d




CASE OF WELFARE - I_0 if $L=0$
PARTICIPATION




Person ① will work in both cases
 Person ② will not work if $l_0 > 0$

The higher w , the less likely people choose B


CASE OF CHILDREN - WHEN child is born, utility changes (value of leisure)



if no child $\sim U_0 \rightarrow A$
 if child born $\sim U_k' \rightarrow B$ - home care




EX Overtime work





$$X = X_0 + w_1 L_1 \quad L_2 < L_1$$

$$= X_0 + w_1 L_1 + w_2 (L - L_1) \quad L > L_1$$



$$w_2 > w_1$$



EX If 8 hours is the only choice!




EX 2 jobs $\begin{cases} \text{high } w \text{ low } L_L \text{ (A)} \\ \text{low } w_L \text{ high } L_H \text{ (B)} \end{cases}$



EX sleeping Time - Borjas pp. 42

Fixed costs of work-around




- $A_1 \text{ MRS}_{LX} = \frac{\Delta X}{\Delta L} \Big|_{U=\text{const}} = W \sim \text{interior solution}$
- $A_0 \sim \text{corner solution}$
- $\text{MRS}_{LX} = \frac{\partial X}{\partial L} \Big|_{U=\text{const}} > W$

• Max $U(L, X)$
 s.t. $X = X_0 + wL = X_0 + w(T - l)$
 $\mathcal{L} = U(L, X) + \lambda [X - X_0 - w(T - l)]$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial L} + \lambda w = 0$$


$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial X} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial X} + \lambda = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial L} = w = \text{MRS} \quad (1)$$




(2) $X = X_0 + wL$


Using 1 & 2 $\rightarrow L^*(\bar{w}, \bar{X}_0)$ ↗ Impact of $w \uparrow$
↘ " of $X_0 \uparrow$ LABOR SUPPLY FCE



best jobs by to



• LABOR SUPPLY CURVE



$$\epsilon_{LW} = \frac{\% \Delta L}{\% \Delta w} = \frac{\frac{\Delta L}{L}}{\frac{\Delta w}{w}} \geq 0$$

Labor supply elasticity

■ MEN - \rightarrow L_s

■ WOMEN - \rightarrow L_s

share of labor income

backward bending curve


uncompensated effect

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial w} = \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial w} \Big|_{U=\text{const}} + L \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial I} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial w} \frac{w}{L^*} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial w} \frac{w}{L^*} \Big|_{U=\text{const}} + \frac{wL^*}{I} \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial I} \frac{I}{L^*}$$

• ADDING UP

Slutsky eq.


$$\epsilon_{LW}^{\text{TOT}} = \epsilon_{L,W}^{\text{comp}} + S_L^* \epsilon_{L,I}$$



$I = wL$
 $dI = dwL + Ldw$
 $\frac{\partial L^*}{\partial I} \frac{\partial I}{\partial w}$

• EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

$$\ln L_i = \beta w_i + \gamma X_i + \text{other}$$



READINGS: ⑬ PENCAVEL HBLE I - La
 ⑪ killing swart - female lab
 ⑩ - simple sta

$\beta_{MEN} = -0.1$
 income effect - 2
 substitution + 0.1
 income effect dominates \rightarrow explains 1900-1950 period
 inelastic

$$\theta = \frac{\% \Delta L}{\% \Delta w} = \frac{\frac{\Delta L}{L}}{\frac{\Delta w}{w}} \text{ labor supply elasticity}$$

• EFFECTS - Empirical evidence

	TOT	SUBS	INC
Men	$0 \pm .1$	$.1 (.5, -.05)$	$-.1$
Wom	$.8$	1.0	$-.2$

β γ

• Estimation

$$L_i = \beta w_i + \gamma X_0 + \text{other}$$

income eff: $\gamma \leq 0$ if normal good

subst. eff: $\beta \geq 0$ • β dominates for women ($\beta \gg 0$)
 and explains growth of L_s women
 during 1900-1950 period