František Kopřiva

Contact Information:

Mail Adress :

VSE - Introduction to Game Theory (5EN254) - Fall 2009

No need to remember definitions - you just need to understand what logic is behind particular solution concept or theory

 

1. Final exam dates and times:

   1. 16.12.2009 10:30 NB350: capacity 15 (priority given to exchange students)

   2. 05.01.2010 17:45 Vencovského aula: capacity 100

   3. 11.01.2010 11:00 NB D: capacity 50

   4. 18.01.2010 10:15 NBD : capacity 50

Final exam

Topics - Enough for 50% out of 60% from the Final exam:

All the topics for midterm may appear also in Final exam:

Dynamic with simultaneous moves:

all examples except the International tariffs

Static games with incomplete information - Bayesian Games:

actions, signals, belief about the states consistent with the signal, types of players, Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game, Finding NE of Bayesian games, Examples - More information may hurt, Infection

Dynamic games with incomplete information:

information(information set and information partition, belief system, behavioral strategy, weak sequential equilibrium – sequential rationality and  consistent beliefs, signaling games, pooling and separating equilibrium, finding weak sequential equilibria in pure strategies

 

Topics - for the rest 10% out of 60% from the Final exam:

electoral competition, war of attrition, reporting crime, expert diagnosis, sequential bargaining with infinite number of moves (time periods)

Dynamic with simultaneous moves:

International tariffs example

Static games with incomplete information - Bayesian Games:

Cournot’s duopoly example, Reporting crime example

Dynamic games with incomplete information:

finding weak sequential equilibria also in mixed strategies

 

 

1. Make up midterm dates and times:

   1. 16.12.2009 9:00 NB350: capacity 20 (priority given to exchange students)

   2. 05.01.2010 16:00 RB211: capacity 30

   3. 11.01.2010 9:00 RB210: capacity 30

Make up midterm

Topics:

Static games:

ordinal preferences, dominated strategies, iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, nash equilibrium, strict nash equilibrium, best response,

vNM preferences over lotteries (Expected utility theory), mixed strategies, mixed strategy nash equilibrium, strictly dominated strategies using also mixed strategies,

Dynamic games:

terminal histories, player function, histories, backward induction, strategies, tree diagram, normal form of dynamic games, nash equilibrium of dynamic games, subgame, subgame perfect nash equilibrium, using backward induction to find all SBNE

Will not be in Make up midterm:

electoral competition, war of attrition, reporting crime, expert diagnosis, sequential bargaining with infinite number of moves (time periods)