

Macroeconomic stability

Transition towards the unilateral peg

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¹The views expressed on this site are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the CNB.

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Model
- 3 Simulation results

Presentation outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Model
- 3 Simulation results

Motivation

- Czech Republic is considering monetary union entry
- Behavior of economy after the announcement of switch toward unilateral peg
- How aggressive will be the response of interest rates to shocks?
- Macroeconomic stability in small open economy environment: Collard & Dellas (2002)
 - ▶ variance of series
 - ▶ evolution of variance
- Modeling a monetary regime change in DSGE model
- Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2007): Recent works rely on Markov switching processes

Presentation outline

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2 Model

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Model I

Justiniano and Preston (2004) framework:

- Two countries:
 - ▶ Home – small economy
 - ▶ Foreign – large economy (monetary union)
- Model features:
 - ▶ No capital
 - ▶ All goods are tradable
 - ▶ Complete markets: Symmetric equilibrium
 - ▶ Nominal rigidities: Monopolistically competitive firms
 - ★ Inflation indexation
 - ★ Domestic producers
 - ★ Importers: Law of one price gap

Model II

- Domestic monetary policy rules:
 - ▶ Pre-transition:
Targeting of inflation, output gap or change in nominal exchange rate
 - ▶ Transition:
Follow pre-transition rule with knowledge of regime switch
 - ▶ Post-transition:
Rule of offsetting changes in the nominal exchange rate

Monetary policy rules

Generalization of monetary regimes:

- Pre-transition regime:

$$i_t^I = \rho_i i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i)(\rho_\pi \pi_t^{CPI} + \rho_y y_t + \rho_e \Delta e_t)$$

- Post-transition regime:

$$i_t^U = \rho_i^U \Delta e_t$$

- Transition regime:

$$i_t^T = \text{regime}_t i_t^I + (1 - \text{regime}_t) i_t^U, \text{ where } \text{regime}_t \in \{0, 1\}$$

Information buffer

- Regime indicator:

$$regime_t = inf_{t,1} \quad (1)$$

$$inf_{t,1} = \rho_{inf} inf_{t,2} + \nu_{t,1}$$

$$inf_{t,2} = \rho_{inf} inf_{t,3} + \nu_{t,2}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$inf_{t,N-1} = \rho_{inf} inf_{t,N} + \nu_{t,N-1}$$

$$inf_{t,N} = \nu_{t,N}, \quad (2)$$

where $\nu_{t,i}$, $i \in 1, \dots, N - 1$ are information shocks and $0 < \rho_{inf} < 1$

- Future information is added to the state space
- Agents foresee the future changes of monetary regime

Solution

- 1 Solve model:
 - ▶ Second order approximation of the monetary policy rule
 - ▶ Dynare++: fast solver for large problems
- 2 Estimate model
 - ▶ Dynare
- 3 Evaluate information shocks and simulate

Estimation

- Bayesian estimation method: Dynare
- Testing properties of the model:
 - ▶ Sample moments vs. model moments
 - ▶ Evaluate impulse response functions
 - ▶ Prior vs. Posterior distributions

Moments comparison


Variable	Data		Model	
	Std. dev.	Corr.	Std. dev.	Corr.
Output growth	1.05	1.00	3.04	1.00
Nominal interest rate	1.38	-0.53	1.84	-0.26
CPI inflation	3.14	-0.12	4.02	-0.15
Change in nominal ex. rate	8.37	0.17	8.54	0.02
Real ex. rate	3.48	0.17	6.79	-0.03
Foreign output gap	0.81	0.02	0.67	0.00
Foreign inflation	0.66	0.21	0.76	-0.01
Foreign nom. int. rate	0.65	-0.03	0.60	0.00

Presentation outline



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Irf: Technology shock


CPI inflation



Output


 Δe 

Nominal int. rate





Irf: Preference shock


CPI inflation



Output

 Δe 

Nominal int. rate



Transition period: Welfare evolution

Welfare evaluation:

- Santacreu (2005):

$$L_t = \tau \text{Var}(\pi_t) + (1 - \tau) \text{Var}(y_t) + \frac{\tau}{4} (\Delta i_t),$$


where $\tau \in (0, 1)$


- Gali & Monacelli (2005):

$$L_t = \frac{\varepsilon}{\lambda} \text{Var}(\pi_t) + (1 + \phi) \text{Var}(y_t),$$


where $\lambda = (1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)/\theta$ and ϕ are parameters of the underlying model

- Terms of trade: Gali & Monacelli (2005) show that the higher the terms of trade volatility \Rightarrow the lower the volatility of inflation and output gap


Loss function: Sancrateu (2005), $\tau = 0$ 

Loss function: Sancrateu (2005), $\tau = 0.8$ 

Loss function: Gali & Monacelli (2005)



Terms of trade variance: Difference from SIT regime



Conclusion

Goals:

- Alternative approach to modeling of regime switch is presented
- Evolution of macroeconomic stability
- Strict inflation targeting regimes are preferred

Future research:

- Extended model
- Synchronization of business cycles