

EXERCISE SESSION JULY 11, 2007

ROHER'S MODEL WITH MODIFIED PROD. FN. IU R&D
(FINAL EXAM 2006)

a) FINAL GOOD SECTOR

$$\max Y_i - wL_i - \sum_{j=1}^A P_j X_{ij} \quad ; \quad Y_i = L_{y,i}^\beta \sum_{j=1}^A X_{ij}^{1-\beta}$$

FOC: $\frac{\partial Y_i}{\partial L_i} = w \Rightarrow \beta \frac{Y_i}{L_{y,i}} = w$

$$L_{y,i} = \frac{\beta}{w} Y_i$$

$$\frac{\partial Y_i}{\partial X_{ij}} = P_j \Rightarrow L_{y,i}^\beta (1-\beta) X_{ij}^{-\beta} = P_j$$

$$X_{ij}^\beta = \frac{1-\beta}{P_j} L_{y,i}^\beta$$

$$X_{ij} = \left(\frac{1-\beta}{P_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} L_{y,i} \quad \#_{j,i}$$

$$X_{ij} = \left(\frac{1-\beta}{P_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \frac{\beta}{w} Y_i \quad \#_{j,i}$$

b) INTERMEDIATE GOOD SECTOR

$$\max P_j(x_j) x_j - x_j$$

FOC: $\frac{\partial P_j}{\partial x_j} x_j + P_j - 1 = 0 \Rightarrow$ we need to express $P_j(x_j)$ from the demand function from F-good sector

$$x_j = \sum_{i=1}^A X_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^A \left(\frac{1-\beta}{P_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} L_{y,i} = \left(\frac{1-\beta}{P_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \sum_{i=1}^A L_{y,i} = \left(\frac{1-\beta}{P_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} L_Y$$

$$\Rightarrow x_j = \left(\frac{1-\beta}{P_j} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} L_Y \Rightarrow P_j = (1-\beta) L_Y^\beta x_j^{-\beta}$$

$$\frac{\partial P_j}{\partial x_j} = -\beta (1-\beta) L_Y^\beta x_j^{-\beta-1}$$

↳ plug this into FOC

$$\underbrace{(1-\beta)L_Y^{\beta}(-\beta)X_j^{-\beta-1}X_j}_{\frac{\partial \pi_j}{\partial X_j}} + \underbrace{(1-\beta)L_Y^{\beta}X_j^{-\beta}}_{\pi_j} = 1$$

$$(1-\beta)L_Y^{\beta}(-\beta)X_j^{-\beta} + X_j^{-\beta}(1-\beta)L_Y^{\beta} = 1$$

$$X_j^{-\beta} \left[(1-\beta)L_Y^{\beta} - \beta(1-\beta)L_Y^{\beta} \right] = 1 \Rightarrow X_j^{\beta} = (1-\beta)^2 L_Y^{\beta}$$

$$X_j = (1-\beta)^{\frac{2}{\beta}} L_Y$$

plug into π_j

$$\pi_j = (1-\beta)L_Y^{\beta}X_j^{-\beta} = (1-\beta)\frac{L_Y^{\beta}}{(1-\beta)^2 L_Y^{\beta}} = \frac{1}{1-\beta} \pi_j$$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{\pi_j = \frac{1}{1-\beta} \pi_j} \Rightarrow \text{each I-good is sold for the same price}$$

PROFIT : $\pi_j = (\pi_j - 1)X_j = \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta} - 1\right)(1-\beta)^{\frac{2}{\beta}} L_Y =$
 $= \frac{1-(1-\beta)}{1-\beta} (1-\beta)^{\frac{2}{\beta}} L_Y =$
 $= \beta(1-\beta)^{\frac{2}{\beta}-1} L_Y$

$$\boxed{\pi_j = \beta(1-\beta)^{\frac{2-\beta}{\beta}} L_Y \pi_j}$$

c) R&D sector

$$\dot{L} = \frac{\dot{L}_R}{\lambda+1} A^{\lambda} \Rightarrow \frac{\dot{L}}{L} = \lambda$$

- (i) $\dot{A} = \frac{\dot{L}_R}{L}$ \rightarrow this is a production function of R&D
- L_R - # labor working in R&D sector
- \dot{L} - # of labor necessary to invent new good
- $\Rightarrow \frac{\dot{L}_R}{L} =$ how many new products can be invented

→ interpretation of $\dot{z} = \frac{\lambda}{L_R^{\lambda-1} A^\epsilon}$

A^ϵ → the more products are in the economy, the less labor is needed to invent something new, "standing on shoulders" - kind of using existing know-how

$L_R^{\lambda-1}$ → "stepping on toes" → after reaching certain ~~level~~ level of productivity, we need less and less labor to work on one thing, thus it might happen that too many people are uselessly working on the same thing

RATE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE:

$$\frac{\dot{A}}{A} = \frac{\frac{L_R}{\dot{z}}}{A} = \frac{L_R}{A \dot{z}} = \frac{L_R}{A \cdot \frac{\lambda}{L_R^{\lambda-1} A^\epsilon}} = \frac{L_R \cdot L_R^{\lambda-1} A^\epsilon}{A \lambda} = \frac{L_R^\lambda A^{\epsilon-1}}{\lambda}$$

along BGP, $\frac{\dot{A}}{A} = \text{constant} \Rightarrow \frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{\dot{A}}{A} \right) = 0$

$$\frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{L_R^\lambda A^{\epsilon-1}}{\lambda} \right) = \lambda \left(\frac{\dot{L}_R}{L_R} \right)^* + (\epsilon-1) \left(\frac{\dot{A}}{A} \right)^* = 0$$

\downarrow
 $= n$

$$\Rightarrow \left(\frac{\dot{A}}{A} \right)^* = \frac{\lambda n}{1-\epsilon}$$

This is not a true endogenous growth model, because if there is no population growth, there will be endogenous growth.

(ii) $V(t) = \int_t^\infty \pi_j(s) e^{-\int_t^s r(\tau) d\tau} ds$... present discounted profit from Skupint

to derive no-arbitrage condition, we differentiate with respect to time

$$V(t) = \int_t^{\infty} \pi_j(s) e^{-\int_t^s r(r) dr} ds$$

$$\dot{V}(t) = \int_t^{\infty} \frac{d}{dt} \left(\pi_j(s) e^{-\int_t^s r(r) dr} ds \right) - 1 \cdot \pi_j(t) e^{-\int_t^t r(r) dr} =$$

$$= \int_t^{\infty} \pi_j(s) \underbrace{\frac{d}{dt} \left(e^{-\int_t^s r(r) dr} \right)}_B ds - \pi_j(t)$$

$$B = \frac{d}{dt} \left(e^{-\int_t^s r(r) dr} \right) = e^{-\int_t^s r(r) dr} \cdot \left[-\left(\int_t^s 0 dr - 1 \cdot r(t) \right) \right] =$$

$$= e^{-\int_t^s r(r) dr} r(t)$$

$$\Rightarrow \dot{V}(t) = \int_t^{\infty} \pi_j(s) e^{-\int_t^s r(r) dr} r(t) ds - \pi_j(t) =$$

$$= r(t) \int_t^{\infty} \pi_j(s) e^{-\int_t^s r(r) dr} ds - \pi_j(t) =$$

$$= r(t) V(t) - \pi_j(t)$$

$$\Rightarrow r(t) = \frac{\pi(t)}{V(t)} + \frac{\dot{V}(t)}{V(t)}$$

$\Rightarrow rV = \pi + \dot{V}$
 \downarrow current profit $\quad \downarrow$ future capital gain
 profit from not investing into R&D, but going to asset market

GROWTH RATE OF PROFITS:
 from (1): $\pi_j = \beta(1-\beta)^{\frac{2-\beta}{\beta}} L_y$

$$\frac{\dot{\pi}}{\pi} = \frac{d}{dt} \left(\ln \pi \right) = \frac{d}{dt} \left(\ln \beta(1-\beta)^{\frac{2-\beta}{\beta}} + \ln L_y \right) = \frac{\dot{L}_y}{L_y} = n$$

because $L = L_R + L_y$ & $\frac{\dot{L}}{L} = n, \frac{\dot{L}_R}{L_R} = n \Rightarrow \frac{\dot{L}_y}{L_y} = n$

growth rate of V :

- from no-arbitrage condition: $\frac{\dot{V}(t)}{V(t)} = r(t) - \frac{\dot{\Pi}(t)}{V(t)}$

on BGP, growth rate of $V(t)$ is constant $\Rightarrow r(t)$ is constant
 on BGP, and $\Pi(t)$ & $V(t)$ grow at the same rate

$\Rightarrow \left(\frac{\dot{V}}{V}\right)^* = \left(\frac{\dot{\Pi}}{\Pi}\right)^* = n$

(iii) FREE-ENTRY CONDITION INTO R&D

means that any firm can pay the R&D sector costs to secure the present value

free entry: $V(t) = \hat{z} \cdot w_R$

↓
 PV of blueprint
 (in units of F-good)

→ quantity of labor needed to invest new product; thus we need to multiply it by w_R to have it in units of F-good

(iv)

$l_R + l_Y = 1$... time allocation of one household
 $L_R = l_R L$... aggregate labor in R&D and F-good sector
 $L_Y = l_Y L$

household's problem:

$\max_{c_t} \int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho-n)t} u(c_t) dt$

s.t.

$c_t + \dot{a}_t = w_R l_R + w_Y l_Y + r a_t - n a_t$

In closed economy, the total assets must be equal to total value of firms:

$$aL = VA \Rightarrow a = \frac{VA}{L}$$

↓

$$\dot{a}L + \dot{L}a = \dot{VA} + \dot{AV}$$

$$\dot{a} = \frac{\dot{VA}}{L} + \frac{\dot{AV}}{L} - \frac{\dot{L}}{L} a$$

$$\dot{a} = \frac{\dot{V}}{V} \cdot \frac{VA}{L} + \dot{A} \frac{V}{L} - n \cdot \frac{VA}{L}$$

↓

plug this into BC of HH

further we use that $w_R = w_Y$, otherwise people would work only in the sector with higher wage

BC:

$$c_L + \left[\frac{\dot{V}}{V} \cdot \frac{VA}{L} + \dot{A} \frac{V}{L} - n \frac{VA}{L} \right] = w(l_R + l_Y) + (r - n) \frac{VA}{L}$$

$$c_L + \dot{A} \frac{V}{L} = w + \frac{VA}{L} \left(r - n + n - \frac{\dot{V}}{V} \right)$$

↑ use no-arbitrage con.

$$c_L + \dot{A} \frac{V}{L} = w + \frac{VA}{L} \cdot \frac{\Pi}{V}$$

$$c_L + \dot{A} \frac{V}{L} = w + \frac{A\Pi}{L}$$

↓
investment into new firms

↓
current profit of all firms divided among all people


(investment into 1 firm is V
number of new firms is \dot{A})

(iv) MARKET FAILURES

- I-good sector is monopolized, monopol works inefficiently, it produces less goods for higher price
 - in R&D sector, too many workers work on the same thing which increases the cost of invention
→ NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY
 - in R&D sector, the more I-goods exist, the lower are costs on inventing new ideas
→ POSITIVE EXTERNALITY
- the decentralized economy considers $L_R \geq A$ in ~~the~~ cost function to be constant, while social planner takes into account future spillovers

(vi) SOCIAL PLANNER

$$\max \int_0^{\infty} u(c_t) e^{-(\rho-n)t} dt$$



$$Y = L_Y^{\beta} A X^{1-\beta}$$

$$\dot{A} = \frac{L_R}{\lambda} = \frac{L_R}{\frac{\lambda-1}{L_R} A} = \frac{\lambda}{L_R} \frac{\epsilon}{A}$$

$$L_R + L_Y = L$$

controls: c, L_R, L_Y, X

states: A

NOTE: We can verify the SP's budget constraint by eliminating w from BC of household.

from zero profit condition in F-good sector:

$$Y_i - wL_{Y_i} - \sum_j X_{ij} P_j = 0 \quad / \sum_i$$

$$\underbrace{\sum_i Y_i}_Y - w \underbrace{\sum_i L_{Y_i}}_{L_Y} - \sum_j \underbrace{\sum_i X_{ij} P_j}_{X_j} = 0$$

$$wL_Y = Y - \sum_j P_j \sum_i X_{ij} = Y - \sum_j P_j X_j \quad (1)$$

from I-good sector

$$\pi_j = P_j X_j - X_j \quad / \sum_j$$

$$\sum_j \pi_j = \sum_j P_j X_j - \sum_j X_j$$

since $X_j \equiv X \quad \forall_j$
 $\pi_j \equiv \pi \quad \forall_j$

$$A\pi = \sum_j P_j X_j - AX$$

\hookrightarrow plug into (1)

$$wL_Y = Y - (A\pi + AX)$$

\hookrightarrow plug into BC of HH

$$C + \dot{A} \frac{V}{L} = w + \frac{A\pi}{L} \quad / \cdot L$$

$$C + \dot{A}V = wL + A\pi \quad (wL = wL_Y + wL_R)$$

$$C + \dot{A}V = (Y - A\pi - AX) + wL_R + A\pi$$

$$C + \dot{A}V = Y - AX + wL_R$$

$$C + AX + \underbrace{(\dot{A}V - wL_R)}_{=0} = Y \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{C + AX = Y}$$

= 0 (from zero profit in RED)

because $\dot{A}V - wL_R = \frac{L_R}{L} \cdot V - wL_R = L_R \left(\frac{V}{L} - w \right) = 0$